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a b s t r a c t
Coordination languages are often used to describe open-ended systems. This makes it
challenging to develop tools for guaranteeing the security of the coordinated systems and
the correctness of their interaction. Successful approaches to this problem have been based
on type systems with dynamic checks; therefore, the correctness properties cannot be
statically enforced. By contrast, static analysis approaches based on Flow Logic usually
guarantee properties statically. In this paper, we show how the insights from the Flow
Logic approach can be used to construct a type system for statically ensuring secure access
to tuple spaces and safe process migration for an extension of the language Klaim.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Coordination languages allow two or more components of an application to communicate, by reading/removing/adding
data to a shared communication medium, in order to accomplish shared goals. These languages are often used to program
applications in open-ended systems, namely systems whose overall structure can change dynamically in unpredictable ways
because the entities involved can join and leave at any time. This open nature exposes applications/systems to malicious
accesses to their data/resources. Also, when process mobility is permitted, one can easily conceive Trojan horses or viruses
spawned at remote localities by malicious entities.
This scenario makes it challenging to develop tools for guaranteeing the security of coordinated components and the
correctness of their interaction. Discretionary access controlmechanisms have been designed by relying either on specifying
the lists of permitted operations associated to the objects, or on specifying the capabilities that the different subjects have
on the objects. The capability-based approach appears to scale better when users are distributed across organizational
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boundaries and to be more appropriate for open distributed systems (see e.g. [36]), because capabilities can be distributed
to the subjects and can be passed on. Moreover, different categories of capabilities need not be statically fixed.
Different techniques have been devised not only to specify but also to enforce access control (see e.g. [35]). The
most traditional one is based on a reference monitor that dynamically intercepts each attempted access to any (critical)
resource and determines whether the intended operations should be allowed or denied. The main disadvantage of this
approach is that security properties can only be checked dynamically, thus lowering the performance of systems. To limit
these drawbacks, many static analysis techniques [27] have been devised. These techniques originate from the work on
compilers [1] where it is imperative that all relevant behaviour of systems be statically determined. The result of analyzing
a program is an analysis estimate that gives a global summary of the properties of interest. However, these approaches often
require knowledge of the full system which makes the analysis more difficult.
To overcome these limitations, hybrid approaches have been investigated that take advantage of both static and dynamic
checks. This is the case in the capability-based type systems for Klaim (Kernel Language for Agents Interaction and Mobility,
[10]), a language specifically designed to program distributed systems made up of several mobile components. Klaim
has proved to be suitable for programming a wide range of distributed applications with agents and code mobility. Its
primitives allow programmers to distribute/retrieve data and processes to/from the nodes of a net and extend the generative
communication in Linda [13] with multiple shared tuple spaces.
In the capability-based type systems forKlaim (see e.g. [11,14]), capabilities are used to specify the access control policies
stating which operations (in, out, eval, . . . ) processes are allowed to perform while running at a given node; type checking
then determines if processes comply with the policy of their hosting node. Access requests are mostly checked statically,
but some dynamic type checks are used to deal with data communication and process migration. In the former case, the
dynamic checks are needed because no constraint is put on the kind of data inserted in tuple spaces; hence, withdrawal
of data must be type controlled to establish matching with the input template. In the latter case, the type check has to be
deferred to runtime because the target node of a process migration, and, hence, its policy, could be statically unknown.
Of course, dynamic checks downgrade system performance and, thus, should be minimized. Therefore, in this paper we
shall show how ideas from the Flow Logic approach [34] to static analysis can be used to enhance Klaim’s type systemswith
means for giving a global account of the behaviour of the system under analysis. Indeed, this seems necessary for dealing
with the distributed nature of tuple spaces and furthermore, it allows us to develop a fully static type system.
The Flow Logic approach borrows from the type-based approach its compositionality in axiomatizing validity of analysis
estimates for a given system.We shall formulate the correctness of our Flow Logic by a subject reduction result andwe shall
also establish a Moore family result showing that a best, i.e. most precise, analysis result exists; the actual computation of
this usually requires global solution of a system of constraints [28]. Thanks to the tight correspondence between the Flow
Logic and the type system, these properties hold for the type system as well.
As a further contribution of this paper, the version of the language Klaim that we take into account is enhanced with a
novel construct, named accept, that allows us to model truly open systems, i.e. systems where new code can be injected
from the outside. In similar scenarios, a referencemonitor semantics is usually used to ensure that the security of the overall
system is not violated. One of the main results of our work is that the static analysis (and the equivalent static type system)
provides a mechanism for checking the behaviour of the new code, thereby allowing us to dispense with the reference
monitor when the code does not violate certain simple conditions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the syntax and semantics of Klaim extended with
the accept construct; we temporarily dispensewith a primitive for creating new localities – thiswill be rectified in Section 5.
We also introduce a running example that will be used throughout the paper to illustrate how the calculus, the Flow Logic
and the type system work. A Flow Logic for the language is developed and proved correct in Section 3 and it is used as
inspiration to design the fully static type system presented in Section 4. Our major result, proved in Section 4, shows that
the two analysis techniques are in accordance. In Section 5 we show how our techniques can be tailored to accommodate
the addition of a primitive for creating new localities and briefly discuss alternative formulations. We conclude in Section 6
with some hints for future work and a discussion of related work.
2. An extension of Klaim
In this section we introduce syntax and operational semantics of the extension of the language Klaimwe consider in this
paper. We also present a running example that will be used in the rest of the paper for illustration purposes.
2.1. Syntax
The process calculus used here, like other members of the Klaim family, consists of three layers: nets, processes, and
actions. Nets specify the overall structure of a system, including where processes and tuple spaces are located. Processes are
the actors in this system and execute by performing actions. The syntax for all these components is presented in the upper
part of Fig. 1, whereas the syntax of the capability-based types is presented in the lower part.
A net consists of processes or tuples located at a locality l, or of a composition of two nets. Processes are built up from
the special process nil, that does not perform any action (and whose tailing occurrences are often omitted), and from the
basic actions by means of prefixing, parallel composition and replication. Hence, the actual building blocks of processes are
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Fig. 1. Syntax of Klaim.
actions: out and in permit to produce/withdraw tuples to/from a possibly remote tuple space; read is a non-destructive
variant of in; evalmodels mobility by spawning processes from a locality to another one, where it will be evaluated. These
actions are all classical Klaim actions whereas the action accept is new: it enables (selectively) processes coming from the
environment to get into the system. Indeed, accept, first introduced in [16], makes the language more suitable to model
open systems, where processes are not necessarily known at the outset and can unpredictably appear during a computation.
For communication, we distinguish between tuples and evaluated tuples. An evaluated tuple is a sequence of values, that
in our case are elements of the set Loc of localities, and can be stored in tuple spaces. In contrast, tuples can contain variables
and self-references, denoted by self, that allow programmers to write processes in a location-independent way. Tuples are
used in processes to compose data to be communicated. We will use pii(t) to denote the i-th component of the tuple t .
For selectively accessing tuples in tuple spaces and, hence, dynamically retrieving information, processes use templates
and a matching function (see Fig. 2). Templates are similar to tuples, but can also contain input variables, denoted as !u,
that are bound in the continuation process. This means that actions in and read are binders for input variables. A variable
occurrence that is not bound is called free.
Network nodes are equipped with a policy that expresses the discretionary access control policy that should be enforced
upon the system. As usual, a discretionary access control policy states which subjects can access which objects using what
capabilities.1 Here we take subjects to be the localities where the action is executed, objects to be the localities accessed (for
example, placing a new evaluated tuple there, inputting or reading an evaluated tuple, or spawning a new process), and
capabilities, c , to be indicators of the access operation, i.e., elements of the set Capabilities representing the out-, in-, read-,
eval-, and accept-actions, respectively. We use C to denote a generic set of capabilities, i.e., a subset of the set Capabilities.
Policies are represented as capability lists. Thus, a policy for some locality ls maps a locality lo to the set of capabilities with
which the subject ls can access the object lo. Formally, we distinguish between Policies and EvaluatedPolicies. They both are
functions from localities to sets of capabilities and differ only in whether they allow self to be used as a locality. Policies, δ,
embedded in the syntax can use self, whereas (evaluated) policies, eδ, associated to some locality, written l ::eδ . . ., cannot.
The policies associated to nodes at the outset and the policies specified in the actions eval and acceptmust be explicitly
defined by the programmer as an integral part of the specification.
2.2. Running example
As a running example, throughout the paperwewill consider a scenariowhere a userwants to collect and elaborate some
pieces of information scattered on network nodes. The Klaim netmodeling the scenario includes the user process (located at
lU ), a bookshop service process (located at lB), and a data container (located at lC ). Moreover, in the example we assume that
1 Although the security model we take into account in this paper exploits the power of capabilities only in a limited way (see, e.g., the semantics of the
newloc action in Section 5), we retain this terminology for uniformity with other papers on Klaim [14,15] where more sophisticated security models are
considered.
R. De Nicola et al. / Science of Computer Programming 75 (2010) 376–397 379
Fig. 2. The matching function.
some sort of primitive data, like strings, are available and can be used as fields of data tuples. This is only for convenience,
since all of the primitive data can be interpreted as localities. The overall structure of the network is as follows:
lU ::eδU PU ‖ lB ::eδB PB ‖ lC ::eδC nil ‖
lC :: 〈J.R.R. Tolkien, The Hobbit〉 ‖ lC :: 〈J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings〉
Each locality hosts running processes that must obey a given access policy and/or contains data tuples. The processes are
defined as follows:
PU = eval(P1 : δ)@lB.in(!data)@self. < elaborate data >
P1 = read(J.R.R. Tolkien, !title)@lC .out(title)@lU
PB = accept(δa)
The policies associate with the eval and the accept actions are
δ = [lU 7→ {o}, lC 7→ {r}] δa = [lC 7→ {r, o}]
and the policies of the localities are
eδU = [lU 7→ {i}, lB 7→ {e}] eδB = [lC 7→ {r, i, o}, lU 7→ {o}] eδC = [ ]
The intended workflow in the example is as follows. The user launches process P1 at lB (this is permitted because
e ∈ eδU(lB)). The process starts by looking for a book written by Tolkien at the repository lC , by reading a tuple with
first component ‘‘J.R.R. Tolkien’’ (this is permitted because r ∈ δ(lC )). When such a book is found, the user is informed by
receiving a datum in its tuple space containing the title (this is permitted because o ∈ δ(lU)). The user then starts working
on it, for example by deciding whether to buy and read the book or look for another one. The bookshop has inserted in its
policy eδB also the i and o capabilities for updating the repository, when a book is out of print orwhen one becomes available.
Notice the presence of action accept(δa) at the bookshop. It allows entrance of code not present at the outset; however,
the accepted code will only be allowed to perform a limited set of operations (delimited by δa). For example, an incoming
process can read the repository and update it by adding new titles; however, it cannot remove existing titles.2
The example is intentionally simplistic and several features have been omitted. We aim only at illustrating how the
calculus, the Flow Logic and the type system work. The example is not meant to be a complete specification of a distributed
system and therefore it does not include modeling of, e.g., scheduling of different processes and similar concepts.
2.3. Operational semantics
The operational semantics is in the form of a reduction semantics. It uses the partial functionmatch of Fig. 2when reading
or inputting, for checking agreement between a template and an (evaluated) tuple. The matching proceeds by comparing a
template T componentwise with an evaluated tuple et . There are two possibilities for the match to succeed. Either both the
template and the tuple begin with the same locality, or the template begins with an input variable; in both cases, the rest of
the tuplesmustmatch. The result of a successfulmatch is a substitution function, σ , that is used to replace in the continuation
process all the free occurrences of the template’s input variables with the values that occurred at corresponding positions
in the matched tuple.3 In the sequel, to ensure that match returns a valid substitution function upon successful matching,
we shall assume that templates T arewell-formed in the sense that, for every given u, they do not contain both u and !u, and
do not contain multiple occurrences of !u.
The reduction semantics operates on closed processes, i.e. processes without free variables, but it still needs to properly
deal with self. This is achieved by two auxiliary functions that map tuples (without free locality variables) to evaluated
tuples, and policies to evaluated policies, respectively. They are both indexed with the locality to be used instead of self and
have the same syntax.
L·Ml : (Loc ∪ {self})→ Loc given by L`Ml = {l if ` = selfl′ if ` = l′ ∈ Loc
L·Ml : Policy→ EvaluatedPolicy given by LδMl(l′) = {δ(l′) if l 6= l′δ(l) ∩ δ(self) if l = l′
2 Of course, the use of more fine-grained capabilities (like those in [15]) would simplify the specification of more realistic policies, prescribing, e.g., that
the new agent can only add/remove certain kinds of tuples and/or must authenticate before performing its tasks.
3 As usual, ‘’ denotes the empty function and juxtaposition, e.g., σ1 σ2 , denotes composition of functions with disjoint domains.
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Fig. 3. Operational semantics of Klaim.
The first function simply replaces self with the subscript, which is supposed to denote the intended meaning of self. We
trivially extend it from working on single localities to working on sequences in a componentwise manner. We also trivially
extend it to work on templates (without free locality variables) by defining it to act as the identity on input variables. The
second function imposes both the policies of l and selfwhenever l′ = l.
Fig. 3 shows the semantics for our calculus — or, to be more precise, it defines two different semantics, one that checks
the access control policies dynamically, and one that checks them statically. In both cases the transitions take the form
L F N −→ N ′
where the set L ⊂ Loc keeps track of used localities and is exploited for testing localities’ existence. Given a net N and an L
as above, the configuration L F N is well-formed if all the localities syntactically occurring in N (both in its tuples, processes
and policies) are contained in L. The semantics is defined only for well-formed configurations.
The reference monitor semantics is obtained by taking RM[φ] to be simply φ, thereby reflecting that the conditions are
checked dynamically; in the following, we shall refer to this semantics by writing L F N −→on N ′. As an example, for the
output action the formula RM[eδ(l′) 3 o] is intended to ensure that the local policy, eδ, does indeed permit output to the
locality l′. In the reference monitor semantics of the accept action, we check that l is ready to accept a process from the
environment by the condition RM[eδ(l) 3 a], whereas the condition RM[· · ·] is ignored by taking it to be universally true.
The alternative semantics will perform the checks statically and dispenses with the dynamic checks of the reference
monitor. It is obtained from Fig. 3 by taking RM[· · ·] to be universally true and, in the rule for accept, by letting RM[φacc] be
φacc . The static analysis/type system to be developed in the next sections will specify φacc in details; intuitively, it ensures
that a new process is admitted only if it complies with the policy specified as argument of the accept action. We shall refer
to this semantics by writing L F N −→off N ′.
Returning to the details of the rules of Fig. 3, we first observe that the out action takes an evaluated tuple and outputs
it at the tuple space identified by `. As for all other actions, execution of the current subprocess is stuck if the tuple is not
fully evaluated, that is if it still contains variables. The in action takes a template T and a locality `, and uses the judgment
for match previously defined to select a tuple matching against T from the tuple space at `. As an effect of the in action,
the matched tuple et is removed from the tuple space and the substitution σ computed by match is applied to the rest of
the process, thereby substituting input variables in T with the corresponding values in et . The read action acts as the in but
leaves the matched tuple in place.
The eval action sends its argument Q for execution to the locality identified by `. Notice that the receiving node has
no control on the incoming code. Of course, we could introduce a sort of complementary coeval action for authorizing
migrations (in the same spirit as co-capabilities in [20]) but, for the sake of simplicity, we prefer the present version of the
language. The ‘sandbox’ policy under which Q will run results from evaluation of the policy specified in the argument of the
action.
The accept action admits into a system new processes coming from the environment (i.e. processes that do not occur in
the term representing the net under consideration) that will run under the ‘sandbox’ policy resulting from evaluation of the
policy specified as argument of the action.
In the rules for eval and accept, we do not impose any condition on the sandbox policy with respect to other policies that
might apply at the target locality; thus, it is expected to have processes at the same locality but with different policies. Of
course, it is possible to add a runtime check imposing that the sandbox policy is less permissive than the policy of the target
node. In the rule for accept, this is simply done by adding the premise eδ′ v eδ, where ‘v’ is inclusion of partial functions
(see Section 3.1 for a formal definition); in the rule for eval, this is done by checking the existence of a node at locality l′
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Fig. 4. Structural congruence.
with some policy eδ′′ and by adding the premise eδ′ v eδ′′. Although from a security point of view this modeling could
seem more convincing, we prefer not to implement it because of two reasons: first, it requires more runtime checks, that
downgrade system performance and are not necessary when working with nets that have already passed a static analysis
phase (the only ones we are really interested in); second, the focus of this work is on the relationships between the Flow
Logic and the type system, thus we prefer to keep the language under consideration as simple as possible. However, it has to
be said that our choice leads to some nets that can safely run with the reference monitor on, but that cannot pass the static
checks; we shall be back on this point in Section 3.9, after having presented the Flow Logic.
To conclude, the last two rules in Fig. 3 are quite standard: the former allows a net to evolve whenever a subnet evolves,
the latter assigns the same semantics to nets related by the structural congruence relation defined by the laws in Fig. 4. In
fact, as usual, reductions are given up to a (quite standard) structural congruence. Its laws say that ‖ is commutative and
associative, that asmany copies as needed can be spawned of a replicated process, that processnil can be absorbed/spawned,
and that a parallel between co-located processes can be turned into a parallel between nodes (and vice versa, provided that
the policies coincide). As a consequence, also | is commutative and associative, and has nil as identity element.
3. Flow Logic
We shall now develop an analysis that captures the behaviour of nets. The analysis computes an overapproximation
of the actual behaviour of a Klaim net. The analysis is specified using the Flow Logic approach to static analysis. A Flow
Logic specification axiomatizes when an analysis estimate is acceptable for a program and relies on various algorithms
for computing the analysis estimate — just like a type system specifies when a program is type correct and relies on type
inference algorithms to actually construct the types. Thus, Flow Logic is a more specification oriented approach to program
analysis than traditional methods, e.g., Data Flow Analysis (see [27]).
Flow Logic specifications usually take the form of a number of judgments one for each syntactic category to be analyzed.
The judgments specify when an analysis estimate is acceptable for a fragment of a term from the relevant syntactic category.
In the rest of the section, we first introduce the abstract domains underlying the analysis, then define the judgments for
actions, processes, nets, and matchings, finally present the theoretical properties of the analysis.
3.1. Analysis domains
In our analysis we shall make use of the following analysis domains:
• Tˆ ∈ Loc → P (Loc∗) is an abstract tuple space; it is an overapproximation of the set of all tuples (of locality constants)
thatmight at some point during the execution reside in the tuple space of a given locality constant.
• σˆ ∈ LocVar→ P (Loc) is an abstract environment; it keeps a record of all locality constants that a given locality variable
might at some point during execution be bound to. (This functionality suffices because the structural congruence does
not contain α-renaming of bound variables.)
• ∂ ∈ AbstractPolicy = Loc → P (Capabilities) is an abstract policy; it summarizes all the concrete policies that a given
locality might have at some point during the execution. Abstract policies form a lattice based on the natural ordering on
partial functions, writtenv, i.e. ∂ v ∂ ′ if and only if dom(∂) ⊆ dom(∂ ′) and ∂(l) ⊆ ∂ ′(l), for every l ∈ dom(∂).
• ∆ ∈ Loc→ AbstractPolicy is a record of policies that may arise at localities during execution due to remotely executed
processes. For every target locality of a remotely executed process (i.e., targets of an eval-action), it summarizes all the
‘‘sandbox’’ policies specified by the eval-action in question. This results in an overapproximation of the possible actions
taken by processes remotely executed at a given locality.
• % ∈ Loc → Loc → P (Capabilities) is a record of potential violations of policies. It records all the actions that might
have been performed during the evolution of the net and where it was not possible to determine that the actions were
permitted by the local policy. The first argument is the subject locality where the action was initiated, and the second
argument is the object locality where the action had effect, and the resulting set of capabilities are the offending ones.
Note that this domain is equivalent to Loc→ AbstractPolicy; however, since policy violations are conceptually different
from abstract policies, we retain the above definition.
• Λ ∈ P (Loc) is a (usually nonempty) set of localities of interest at a given point. In general, we shall analyze processes
at sets of localities (rather than at a single locality) in order to obtain a context insensitive analysis and to keep the
complexity of the analysis low. A more precise analysis can be obtained by analyzing processes at single localities but it
would require that some processes are analyzed more than once — indeed this approach is taken in [16].
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Fig. 5. Static analysis of actions.
3.2. Analysis of actions
The judgment for an action α has the following form:
(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛA α : ∂, %
and is defined by the inference system of Fig. 5 to be explained in more detail below. Intuitively, the above judgment reads:
‘‘(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) is an acceptable analysis estimate for the action α when occurring in the context Λ and it can only give rise to
the policy violations recorded in % and it can only impose the policy requirements ∂ on other localities’’. In other words:
Tˆ , ∆, and σˆ correctly capture the behaviour of the action α when executed in the context Λ and at the same time ∂ and %
provide records of the potential policies that α might impose on other localities and the potential policy violations that α
might give rise to. As is usual in Flow Logic, we provide a componentwise definition.
Before explaining the rules of Fig. 5 we introduce some notation. We shall need to transform localities ` ∈ Loc∪ {self} ∪
LocVar into the set of localities that they denote; this is necessary both because we have locality variables and because we
have the self construct. For this we make use of the auxiliary function
L·MΛ
σˆ
: Loc ∪ {self} ∪ LocVar→ P (Loc)
L`MΛ
σˆ
=
{{`} if ` ∈ Loc
Λ if ` = self
σˆ (`) if ` ∈ LocVar
This transformation is straightforward for locality constants, while it exploits the setΛ of locality constants that selfmight
stand for, in the case of self, and the abstract environment σˆ , in the case of locality variables. This operation is extended to
tuples t by taking the Cartesian product of all components. As an example, in the rule for out we write LtMΛ
σˆ
for the set of
potential tuples that could be output to one of the localities of L`MΛ
σˆ
. It is easy to see that for evaluated tuples et , we haveLet MΛ
σˆ
= {et}.
To more easily express that the appropriate record of actions is captured by the policy component ∂ , we use the notation
[X → Y ] : Loc→ P (Capability)
[X → Y ](λ) =
{
Y if λ ∈ X
∅ otherwise
Here X is the set of localities where the actions recorded in Y might have effect and Y is usually is a singleton set, namely the
action taking place. In the case of out, in, read and eval, we take X to be the set L`MΛ
σˆ
; in the case of accept, we take X to be
the setΛ of current localities. As an example, for the out action we will write [L`MΛ
σˆ
→ {o} ] v ∂ to record that at any of the
localities of L`MΛ
σˆ
wemight perform an out action and this must be recorded in the overall abstract policy ∂ of the particular
occurrence of the action we are interested in. As another example, for the accept action we will have the somewhat simpler
condition [Λ → {a} ] v ∂ where we exploit that the process accepted from the environment will have to be executed at
the current locality which will be one of the localities inΛ.
Since most of the rules need to take effect for any element in some set of locality constants, it is frequently necessary to
write logical formulae using universal and existential quantifiers. The resulting formulae tend to clutter the understanding
of the more subtle features of the Flow Logic specification and we have therefore decided to introduce two notational
shorthands so as to reduce the explicit use of quantifiers. The notations are formally defined by:
Ψ [X] =⋃x∈X Ψ (x)= {z | ∃x ∈ X : z ∈ Ψ (x)}
Ψ 〈X〉 =⋂x∈X Ψ (x)= {z | ∀x ∈ X : z ∈ Ψ (x)}
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It is worth pointing out that this permits to use them in inclusions and that they can be expanded away using the following
tautologies:
Ψ [X] ⊆ Z ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ X:Ψ (x) ⊆ Z
Z ⊆ Ψ 〈X〉 ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ X: Z ⊆ Ψ (x)
As an example, in the rule for out the premise LtMΛ
σˆ
⊆ Tˆ 〈L`MΛ
σˆ
〉 expresses that all the values that t may evaluate to are
included in all the tuple spaces that could be associated with the locality `.
The semantics of in and read make use of pattern matching and we also need to capture this in the analysis. We have
developed an analysis for this making use of judgments of the form
σˆ |HΛ1 T : Uˆ F Wˆ
The detailed definition is given later; at this stage it is sufficient to know that the judgment expresses that Wˆ contains the
tuples of Uˆ that can be successfully matched against the template T in the contextΛ, and that σˆ records the corresponding
bindings to the variables of T . In the rules for in and readwemake use of the premise σˆ |HL`MΛσˆ1 T : UˆFWˆ where Uˆ = Tˆ [L`MΛσˆ ].
This expresses that the template T is matched against all the possible tuples of Uˆ , which is constructed as the union of all the
sets of tuples that the localities of `might denote. In the analysis we aremainly interested in the bindings that the successful
matches impose on σˆ so the actual set of successful matches Wˆ is not used in the analysis.
The next piece of notation needed in order to explain Fig. 5 is concerned with how to transform concrete policies into
abstract policies. Here we make use of two functions; the first, denoted LδMΛ∪ , is used in conjunction with the ∂ component
of the analysis to overapproximate the potential set of actions permitted by the concrete policy δ. It is defined by
LδMΛ∪ (λ)=⋃λ′∈ΛLδM{λ′}(λ)
LδM{λ′}(λ)= {δ(λ) if λ 6= λ′
δ(λ) ∩ δ(self) if λ = λ′
where the use of LδM{λ′}(λ)makes sure to include contributions from self of δ in the abstract policy. As an example, the rule
for accept includes the premise LδMΛ∪ v ∂ in order to ensure that the abstract policy ∂ records all the actions that a process
accepted from the environment might perform. Similarly the rule for eval includes the premise ∀λ ∈ L`MΛ
σˆ
: LδMΛ∪ v ∆(λ)
to ensure that the correct information is recorded in∆ for all the localities where a process might be remotely executed at.
The second function, denoted LδMΛ∩ , is used to compute the set of actions definitely permitted by a concrete policy. This
results in an underapproximation that can be used to remove definitely allowed actions from the error component, %, and
thereby improve the accuracy of the analysis. The function is defined by
LδMΛ∩ (λ)=⋂λ′∈ΛLδM{λ′}(λ)
where LδM{λ′} is as above.
The definitions of LδMΛ∪ and LδMΛ∩ are based on the observation that LδM{λ′} is the ‘‘precise’’ function that is neededwhenwe
know that the only possible value of self is the single value λ′ (hence the superscript is {λ′}). We already observed that the
setΛ of possible localities for selfwill in practice never be empty because we will always be at least at one place. Then the
overapproximation is taken to be the pointwise union and the underapproximation is taken to be the pointwise intersection
of the ‘‘precise’’ function.
The underapproximation is used in the rule for evalwhere one of the premises is ∂ ′\L`MΛ
σˆ
LδMΛ∩ v %. Here ∂ ′ is the abstract
policy obtained by analyzing the remotely executed process P and LδMΛ∩ is a record of the access rights that we have specified
for P . However, before explaining that in detail, we need to introduce an operation for ‘‘subtracting’’ two policies:
∂1 \Λ ∂2 : Loc→ AbstractPolicy
(∂1 \Λ ∂2)(λs)(λo)=
{
∂1(λo) \ ∂2(λo) if λs ∈ Λ
∅ otherwise
The subscript Λ is used to identify the localities where the subtraction should have effect. In the premise ∂ ′\L`MΛ
σˆ
LδMΛ∩ v %
discussed abovewe are only concerned about access violations at the localitieswhere the newprocessmay be spawned (that
is, L`MΛ
σˆ
) and we want the analysis to record in % the violations that potentially might be problematic, that is, the difference
between those recorded by the abstract policy obtained by analyzing the spawned process (that is, the overapproximation
∂ ′) and those that definitely are non-problematic (that is, LδMΛ∩ ). Since the latter is an underapproximation, the subtraction
∂ ′\L`MΛ
σˆ
LδMΛ∩ will still be an overapproximation.
Having these notations in place, we can now return to the rules in Fig. 5. The rule for out evaluates the tuple t usingLtMΛ
σˆ
to identify all possible tuples that could be output. Similarly, L`MΛ
σˆ
identifies all localities that could be the target of the
action. The subset constraint LtMΛ
σˆ
⊆ Tˆ 〈L`MΛ
σˆ
〉 ensures that all possible tuples are stored in the abstract tuple spaces of all
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Fig. 6. Static analysis of processes.
Fig. 7. Static analysis of nets.
possible target localities. Additionally, we record in the abstract policy ∂ that out could have been performed on all possible
target localities.
The remaining rules are similar and we only point out novel features. In the rule for inwe first need to pattern match the
template T against all the possible tuples that could be input. The idea behind the analysis has been sketched above, pattern
matching itself is discussed in Section 3.5. The analysis ensures that the environment σˆ correctly represents bindings of free
variables in the template. The rule for the non-destructive read proceeds identically; this is because the analysis needs to
be conservative. The rule for accept uses LδMΛ∪ v ∂ to ensure that the abstract policy ∂ records all the actions that a process
accepted from the environment might perform.
The rule for eval is themost complex one. To ensure that the analysis correctly captures all possibly executed actions, the
process P is analyzed in all localities it possibly could be executed at. From the abstract policy ∂ ′ obtained from analyzing the
process P we remove all those privileges that have been definitely granted to P . The remaining elements are added to the
error component. As for accept, we must also ensure that ∆ records all the actions that process P might possibly perform,
for all the localities where P might be remotely executed at.
3.3. Analysis of processes
Let us now turn our attention to the analysis of processes. The judgment for the analysis of a process P has the form
(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P : ∂, %
and is defined by the inference system of Fig. 6 to be explained shortly. The intention is that when true, the components Tˆ ,
∆, σˆ , ∂ and % correctly capture the behaviour of the process P (when located at one of the localities λ ∈ Λ). Any violation
encountered during analysis of the process is recorded in %, whereas ∂ approximates the actual policy employed by the
process.
We now return to the rules of Fig. 6. The rule for nil should be obvious. For processes in parallel we analyze both of
them using the same error component and abstract policy as for their parallel composition. This is merely for simplicity: an
alternativewould be to use premises (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP Pi : ∂i, %iwith different error components and abstract policies and then
additionally require that ∂i v ∂ and %i v % in order to conclude (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P1 | P2 : ∂, %. The same holds for the rule for
action prefixing, where both the action and the remaining process are analyzed using the same components. Finally, we note
that the analysis for replication only considers the process once as this is sufficient for collecting the relevant information.
3.4. Analysis of nets
The judgment for a net N has the following form:
(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : %
and intuitively it reads: ‘‘(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) is an acceptable analysis estimate for the net N and it will only give rise to the policy
violations recorded in %’’. The judgment is defined by the rules of Fig. 7 that we now comment on.
When analyzing a process P located at locality lwith policy eδwe first analyze that process. Using the subtraction operator
introduced earlier we ensure that all actions possibly performed by P but not allowed by the policy eδ are included in the
error component. Finally, also the error component %′ obtained from P must be included in the overall error component %.
For an evaluated tuple located at lwe record that the tuple is stored at the abstract tuple space Tˆ (l). Finally, parallel nets are
analyzed individually using the same error component as explained above (viz. for parallel processes).
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Fig. 8. Static analysis of matching.
3.5. Analysis of matching
In the analysis of the in and read actions in Fig. 5, we made use of a judgment for analyzing pattern matching that has
the following general form:
σˆ |HΛi T : Uˆ F Wˆ
It expresses that matching should start at position i in the template T , that Uˆ contains the set of tuples that we are matching
against, that Wˆ contains the tuples from Uˆ that successfully match T from position i and onwards, and finally that σˆ records
the appropriate bindings that need to be performed. In the rules of Fig. 8, recall that pii(et) denotes the i-th component of
the tuple et; pii(Vˆ ) is its componentwise extension to sets of tuples.
Pattern matching is triggered by the input rules in Fig. 5 by invoking it with i = 1 and with Uˆ being initialized to the
abstract tuple space from which the input action is reading. The rules in Fig. 8 then traverse the template from left to right
to construct a set of tuples that could match. After this, each element of the template is inspected again, and tuples that do
not match are deleted.
We first look at the traversal of templates from left to right (last two rules of Fig. 8). If the current template element is
an input variable, all sufficiently long tuples from Uˆ are selected. If the element is a locality constant ` then only tuples in Uˆ
with ` at position i are selected. The resulting set Vˆ is then forwarded to the analysis of the rest of the template for i+ 1.
If the end of the template is reached, the first two rules of Fig. 8 apply. Both rules apply the same constraints as their
siblings just discussed. Additionally they select only those tuples that have the correct length; since we now are at the last
element of the template, we know that the index i is the length of tuples we can match. Furthermore in the case of an input
variable uwe ensure that the i-th component of the remaining tuples is added to the abstract environment of u. Once these
rules end the left–right traversal of the template, this is also ensured for all input variables encountered before (last rule of
Fig. 8).
3.6. Acceptable terms
If we for a moment ignore the accept action, we would be ready to establish the semantic correctness of our analysis.
This would be expressed as a subject reduction result:
If L F N −→off N ′ and (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥, then (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N ′ : ⊥.
Here (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥ expresses that the net N is policy conformant and the above result states that this property
is preserved by the semantics even when dispensing with the reference monitor. Also, we would be able to show that
the semantics without the reference monitor does not allow more transitions than the one with the reference monitor as
expressed by the adequacy result:
If L F N −→off N ′ and (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥, then L F N −→on N ′.
However, our calculus does include the accept action; so, we are not ready to prove the above results for the full calculus.
We first need to finalize the semantics presented in Fig. 3 and, in particular, to define the premise RM[φacc] of the rule for
accept. The idea is that an external process can be accepted into a given net if it can be analyzed with respect to an access
policy defined by the accepting process. This ensures that the accepting process can control what access privileges it is
willing to pass onto programs that may be unknown a priori. For an accepting process l ::eδ accept(δ′).P willing to admit an
external process Q that complies with policy δ′, this check amounts to the following requirement on Q :
(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}P Q : Lδ′M{l},⊥
The check guarantees that process Q , when executed at locality l, will only perform actions that do not violate the accepting
policy δ′, as indicated by ‘‘Lδ′M{l},⊥" on the right hand side of the colon. Here Tˆ , ∆ and σˆ should be considered ‘‘global
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constants’’ to be used for an entire execution of a net; this will be clarified in Theorem 3.1 below. Thus, we may complete
the semantics in Fig. 3 by letting
φacc = (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}P Q : Lδ′M{l},⊥
3.7. Analysis of the running example
For the running example, we have (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥ for the following choice of Tˆ ,∆ and σˆ :
Tˆ : lU 7→ {〈The Hobbit〉, 〈The Lord of the Rings〉, 〈The Silmarillion〉}
lB 7→ {}
lC 7→ {〈J.R.R. Tolkien, The Hobbit〉, 〈J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings〉,
〈J.R.R. Tolkien, The Silmarillion〉}
σˆ : title 7→ {The Hobbit, The Lord of the Rings, The Silmarillion}
data 7→ {The Hobbit, The Lord of the Rings, The Silmarillion}
∆ : lU 7→ ⊥
lB 7→ δ
lC 7→ ⊥
This is an acceptable analysis result for the net although it is not the best (or least) solution. Consider now the two processes
Q1 = out(J.R.R. Tolkien, The Silmarillion)@lC
Q2 = in(J.R.R. Tolkien, The Hobbit)@lC
Here (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{lB}P Q1 : δa,⊥ because [lC 7→ {o}] v δa and this means that Q1 can be accepted into the net. On the other
hand, it is not the case that (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{lB}P Q2 : δa,⊥ since [lC 7→ {i}] 6v δa and this means that Q2 will not be accepted into
the net.
3.8. Properties of the analysis
We are now ready to prove the results envisioned above. As already mentioned the overall correctness of the analysis is
formalized as a subject reduction and an adequacy theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Subject Reduction). If L F N −→off N ′ and (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥, then (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N ′ : ⊥.
Proof. The proof is by induction on L F N −→off N ′, using a few auxiliary results:
• The analysis result is invariant under the structural congruence:
If N ≡ N ′ then (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : % if and only if (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N ′ : %.
The proof is by induction on the proof tree establishing N ≡ N ′ and is standard.
• The analysis of matching is correct:
If match(LT Ml, et) = σ , l ∈ Λ, et ∈ Uˆ , and σˆ |HΛ1 T : Uˆ F Wˆ , then et ∈ Wˆ and ∀u ∈ dom(σ ) : σ(u) ∈ σˆ (u).
The proof is by structural induction on the template T and is standard.
• The analysis result is stable under substitution:
If (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P : % and λ ∈ σˆ (u) then (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P[λ/u] : %.
If (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛA α : ∂, % and λ ∈ σˆ (u) then (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛA α[λ/u] : ∂, %.
If σˆ |HΛi T : Uˆ F Wˆ and λ ∈ σˆ (u) then σˆ |HΛi T [λ/u] : Uˆ F Wˆ .
The proof is a standard proof by mutual structural induction (mutual structural induction is used because actions may
occur inside processes as well as processes inside actions).
The proof of the main theorem is then fairly standard and we only show how to prove subject reduction for the in and
eval actions.
Assume that N = l ::eδ in(T )@`.P ‖ l′ :: 〈et〉, N ′ = l ::eδ Pσ , match(LT Ml, et) = σ , L`Ml = l′ such that L F N −→off N ′,
and further assume that (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN l ::eδ in(T )@`.P ‖ l′ :: 〈et〉 : ⊥. By the premises of the rules for action prefixing and
action in, we have that (for some ∂ ′)
1. match(LT Ml, et) = σ
2. (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}P in(T )@` : ∂ ′,⊥
3. (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}P P : ∂ ′,⊥
4. ∂ ′ \{l} eδ v ⊥
5. ∆(l) \{l} eδ v ⊥
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We have that L`M{l}
σˆ
= {l′} and we then get that σˆ |HL`M{l}σˆ1 T : Tˆ [L`M{l}σˆ ] F Wˆ using points (1) and (2); using next the auxiliary
results stated above we have ∀u ∈ dom(σ ) : σ(u) ∈ σˆ (u). From point (3) and the auxiliary results stated above we get
(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}P Pσ : ∂ ′,⊥. Combined with points (4), and (5) we arrive at (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN l ::eδ Pσ : ⊥ which concludes the
case.
Assume that N = l ::eδ eval(Q : δ′)@`.P , N ′ = l ::eδ P ‖ l′ ::eδ′ Q , L`Ml = l′ such that L F N −→off N ′, and further assume
that (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN l ::eδ eval(Q : δ′)@`.P : ⊥; by the premises of the semantic rule and analysis clause for eval we have
that (for some ∂ ′)
1. (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}A eval(Q : δ′)@` : ∂ ′,⊥
2. (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}P P : ∂ ′,⊥
3. ∂ ′ \{l} eδ v ⊥
4. ∆(l) \{l} eδ v ⊥
From points (2), (3), and (4) we get that (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN l ::eδ P : ⊥ and from point (1) we have that (for some ∂ ′′)
5. (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HL`M{l}σˆP Q : ∂ ′′,⊥
6. ∂ ′′ \L`M{l}
σˆ
Lδ′M{l}∩ v ⊥
7. ∀λ ∈ L`M{l}
σˆ
: Lδ′M{l}∪ v ∆(l)
Point (5) gives us that (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}P Q : ∂ ′′,⊥ since l′ = L`Ml ∈ L`M{l}σˆ . We further have that eδ′ = Leδ′M{l}∩ and thus
∂ ′ \{l′} eδ′ v ⊥. From point (7) above we get that eδ′ v ∆(l′). Combining all of the above we now have (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN l ::eδ
P ‖ l′ ::eδ′ Q : ⊥which concludes the case. 
Note that this result also holds with % in place of⊥, but it is more instructive to consider executions where no security
policy is violated; the result clearly does not hold if −→on is used (as RM[· · ·] then equals true and any accepted process
may violate not only the analysis but also the security policy).
Theorem 3.2 (Adequacy). If L F N −→off N ′ and (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥, then L F N −→on N ′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on L F N −→off N ′, by inspecting Figs. 5–8. It is straightforward and we only consider two
cases.
We first consider the case of input. Suppose that
L F l ::eδ in(T )@`.P ‖ l′ :: 〈et〉 −→off l ::eδ Pσ
because L`Ml = l′ andmatch(LT Ml, et) = σ . To show that
L F l ::eδ in(T )@`.P ‖ l′ :: 〈et〉 −→on l ::eδ Pσ
it suffices to additionally show that eδ(l′) 3 i. It is immediate from the assumption of Theorem 3.2 that
(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}P in(T )@`.P : ∂,⊥
with ∂ \{l} eδ v ⊥
Since Fig. 5 ensures that [{l} → {i} ] v ∂ this gives eδ(l′) 3 i.
Next we consider the case of accept. Suppose that
L F l ::eδ accept(δ′).P −→off l ::eδ P ‖ l ::eδ′ Q
because Lδ′Ml = eδ′ and φacc . To show that
L F l ::eδ accept(δ′).P −→on l ::eδ P ‖ l ::eδ′ Q
it suffices to additionally show that eδ(l) 3 a. It is immediate from the assumption of Theorem 3.2 that
(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}P l ::eδ accept(δ′).P : ∂,⊥
with ∂ \{l} eδ v ⊥
Since Fig. 5 ensures that [{l} → {a} ] v ∂ this gives eδ(l′) 3 a.
This finishes the proof. 
In fact, it can be shown that, if L F N −→off N ′ and (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : %, then all offending actions performed are listed in
%.
Finally, the existence of best analysis estimates is formalized as a Moore family (or model intersection) property. As a
corollary we get that for all nets N there exist Tˆ ,∆, σˆ and % such that (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : %. Thus the analysis in itself does not
impose any of the limitations or policies of the reference monitor. But surely only some nets can be analyzed with % = ⊥
and in that case the results of above theorems apply.
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Theorem 3.3 (Moore Family). For all nets N, the set Y of analysis estimates {(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ , %) | (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : %} is a Moore
family; i.e., ∀Y ⊆ Y : uY ∈ Y where u is the greatest lower bound operation.
Proof. We prove the result by mutual structural induction using also the following results.
• For all processes P , the set of analysis estimates {(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ,Λ, ∂, %) | (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P : ∂, %} is a Moore family.
• For all actions α, the set of analysis estimates {(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ,Λ, ∂, %) | (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛA α : ∂, %} is a Moore family.
• For all templates T and indices i, the set of analysis estimates {(σˆ ,Λ, Uˆ, Wˆ ) | σˆ |HΛi T : Uˆ F Wˆ } is a Moore family.
The proof of the main result is standard. Intuitively it uses that all ‘‘constraints’’ on the analysis information occur in
‘‘positive’’ positions only. It is by mutual structural induction because actions may occur in processes as well as processes in
actions. We only illustrate the case of input.
Consider a family J of indices ranged over by j. Suppose that
∀j ∈ J : (Tˆj,∆j, σˆj) |HΛjA in(T )@` : ∂j, %j
By Fig. 5 we have
∀j ∈ J : σˆj |H
L`MΛj
σˆj
1 T : Tˆj[L`MΛjσˆj ] B Wˆj
∀j ∈ J : [L`MΛj
σˆj
→ {i} ] v ∂j
Next write
(Tˆ?,∆?, σˆ?,Λ?, ∂?, %?) = uj(Tˆj,∆j, σˆj,Λj, ∂j, %j)
From the induction hypothesis we have
σˆ? |H
L`MΛ?
σˆ?
1 T : Tˆ?[L`MΛ?σˆ? ] B Wˆ?
since ujL`MΛjσˆj = L`MΛ?σˆ? and
ujTˆj[L`MΛjσˆj ] = uj{z | ∃x ∈ L`MΛjσˆj : z ∈ Tˆj(x)}
= {z | ∃x ∈ L`MΛ?
σˆ?
: z ∈ Tˆ?(x)}
= Tˆ?[L`MΛ?σˆ? ]
Next, ∀j ∈ J : [L`MΛ?
σˆ?
→ {i} ] v ∂j and hence [L`MΛ?σˆ? → {i} ] v ∂?. This suffices for showing
(Tˆ?,∆?, σˆ?) |HΛ?A in(T )@` : ∂?, %?
as desired. 
The Moore family result ensures that a best, or least, analysis result can be found but it does not give a constructive
algorithm for finding the analysis result. To do so the idea is to develop an algorithm converting the clauses into constraints
and in particular Alternation-free Least Fixed Point Logic [28] has proved very useful for expressing these constraints as it
is the basis for obtaining efficient implementations using for example the Succinct Solver [28,26].
3.9. Final remarks
The analysis presented in this paper is an extension of a reworked version of the analysis specified in [16], the main
extension being an added∆ component to give a record of the policies imposed by the local eval’s. We have also reworked
and rationalized the notation and introduced a number of auxiliary functions (most notably, 〈 〉 and [ ]) to increase readability
of the analysis. Finally, we have added theΛ component (essentially allowing remotely executed processes to be analyzed
only once rather than at each receiving locality as in [16]). This reduces the computational cost of computing the analysis
result as it will only be necessary to analyze each fragment of a term once.
As we have already mentioned, the static analysis is a sound but not a complete technique, as expected. Indeed, there
are examples of nets that can safely run with the reference monitor on, but that are not acceptable. This may happen, for
example, when the policy associated to an eval-action is more permissive than the local policy of the receiving node. As a
simple example, consider the net
l ::eδ eval(P : δ)@l′ ‖ l′ ::eδ′ nil
where eδ = [l′ 7→ {e}], δ = [l′ 7→ {e, r}] and eδ′ = [l′ 7→ {r}]. This net is not policy conformant — indeed it is
analyzable with [l′ 7→ {e}] as the potential policy violations. To see this, note that the analysis component ∆ must satisfy
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{e, r} ⊆ ∆(l′)(l′) (see the third premise of the last rule in Fig. 5) and therefore the policy violations % of the overall net will
have to satisfy∆(l′) \l′ eδ′ v % (see the third premise of the first rule of Fig. 7). Since eδ′ maps l′ to {r} it cannot be the case
that % = ∅. Nevertheless, in one reduction step the net reduces to
l ::eδ nil ‖ l′ ::δ P ‖ l′ ::eδ′ nil
that can go on reducing also with the reference monitor on, assuming that P only performs read- and eval-actions over l′
(by the way, the net so obtained will be policy conformant).
4. A static type system
Typing approaches to Klaim usually exploit dynamic checks; we now present a totally static type system whose design
has been inspired by the Flow Logic developed in the previous section.We conclude this section by presenting the theoretical
properties of the type system and the analysis of our running example.
4.1. Types and auxiliary functions
We can get rid of dynamic checks by following the philosophy underlying the Flow Logic approach. Indeed, it suffices to
associate to every locality an upper bound of the tuples it can contain (like function Tˆ in Section 3) and a lower bound on its
policy; moreover, we should also provide an upper bound to the set of localities that each variable can assume (like function
σˆ ). Thus, types for localities are pairs 〈T ; ∂〉, where T ⊂fin Loc∗. Intuitively, if 〈T ; ∂〉 is the type of l, T is an upper bound on
the tuples that l can contain and ∂ is a lower bound on l’s policy. Types for input variables are, instead, just sets of localities;
we can assign to u the type T ⊂fin Loc, meaning that T are the localities that u can assume. A typing environment Γ assigns
types to localities and variables.
Given a typing environment Γ , we now define some functions that will be used in the type system. First, we need to
specify the values an identifier can assume. Thus, valΓ (l) = {l} and valΓ (u) = Γ (u); the definition of function valΓ is
extended to tuples componentwise. In the type system, we shall frequently look at the possible tuples a node can contain,
at its policy or at the privileges it owns over the other nodes of the net. These pieces of information are easily accessible
when the node is specified by a locality constant, thanks to the typing environment given. However, it can also happen in
the typing phase to have nodes specified by variables (take, e.g., process in(!u)@l.eval(Q : δ)@u.P , where Q must be typed
at u). In this case, the information must be extracted from Γ as follows.
The tuples that can appear at a node identified by a variable are obtained by considering the tuples that can appear at
every node whose locality is associated to the variable. However, from case to case, we need to know the tuples shared by
all such nodes or all the possible tuples; accordingly, we combine the tuples contained at the different nodes by intersection
or union. The following functions perform these tasks:
Γ 〈`〉 =
⋂
l∈ valΓ (`) pi1(Γ (l)) Γ [`] =
⋃
l∈ valΓ (`) pi1(Γ (l))
To know the rights a policy definitely grants over a node identified by a variable, we consider the intersection of all the
privileges over the localities that the variable can assume:
PrivΓ (∂, `) =
⋂
l∈ valΓ (`) ∂(l)
Similarly, the policy of a node identified by a variable is the intersection of all the policies of every locality that the variable
can assume:
PolΓ (`) =
l
l∈ valΓ (`) pi2(Γ (l))
where u denotes the greatest lower bound.
In the typing rules, we shall need to evaluate localities and policies to replace occurrences of self. In both cases, we
extend the evaluation function for localities and policies introduced when presenting the operational semantics to allow
the subscript to also be a variable (in the case in which the node where the execution takes place is identified by a variable).
This leads to notations L`′M` and LδMΓ` : for the former, we have that L`′M` is `′, if `′ 6= self, and is ` otherwise; for the latter,
we have that LδMΓ` (l) is δ(l), if l 6∈ valΓ (`), and is δ(l) ∩ δ(self), otherwise.
Finally, given a typing environment Γ and a template T used by a process for matching tuples located at locality `, we
need to check thatΓ provides an upper bound on the localities that variables bound in T can assume. This is needed to ensure
that function valΓ (and, consequently, functions PrivΓ , PolΓ , Γ 〈·〉 and Γ [·]) correctly overapproximates the values (the
privileges, the policy and the tuples, respectively) of every variable. Thus, we define the check of Γ with T at `, written
check`(Γ , T ), as the judgment:
∀i.pii(T ) =!u⇒
pii({et ∈ Γ [`] : |et| = |T | ∧ ∀j ∈ {1..|T |}. pij(T ) = `′ ⇒ pij(et) ∈ valΓ (`′)})
⊆ Γ (u)
In particular, every variable bound in T will be associated to all the possible localities that, at runtime, can be used to
instantiate such a variable. For every i such that the i-th field of T is a variable, these localities are obtained by taking all the
possible tuples of the same length as T that can match against it and can appear at `, and considering their i-th projection.
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Fig. 9. Typing processes.
Fig. 10. Typing nets.
4.2. Typing rules
We are now ready to present the typing system. The typing rules for processes are in Fig. 9 and define judgments of the
form Γ ; ∂ `` P . Intuitively, such a judgment is needed to type under Γ a process P running at ` (where, by construction of
the typingsystem, ` cannot be self) associated with policy ∂ . The key rules are for action prefixes. In all cases, it is verified
that the policy associated to the process provides a proper access right; to this aim, if the action can take place remotely,
a preliminary evaluation of the locality target of the action is needed. Moreover, it is also checked that the continuation
is well-typed. There are then some other specific checks that depend on the action. For action out, it is checked that the
tuples that the action can produce can appear at every possible target locality; thus, it is used here the intersection of all
the possible tuple spaces, as calculated by Γ 〈〉. For action eval, it is checked that the specified policy conforms to the policy
associated to the target and, in this case, that the spawned process can run under the specified ‘sandbox’ policy at the target
locality. For actions in and read, it is checked that Γ provides the right information on the variables bound in T . Finally, for
action accept, it is checked that the specified policy conforms to the policy of the hosting node.
The typing rules for nets are in Fig. 10; they define judgments of the form Γ ` N that should be read as: ‘‘net N respects
the constraints specified on its nodes by Γ ". The rules are simple: to type a compound net we should type the components
individually; to type a located tuple, we must ensure that the tuple is allowed by Γ ; to type a located process, we must
ensure that the policy eδ conforms to the policy specified by Γ and that, when located at l, the process respects eδ.
We can now complete the semantics in Fig. 3 by using as φ in the rule for the action accept the judgment Γ ; ∂ ′ `l Q ,
where Γ is the typing environment used to type the net containing l ::eδ accept(δ′).P and ∂ ′ = Lδ′Ml.
4.3. Soundness results
A net N is typeable if there exists a Γ such that Γ ` N . We now prove that typeable nets are exactly the ones that
can be accepted by the Flow Logic without errors (in Section 3.6 such nets were called policy conformant); as a corollary of
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, this result trivially entails that also the type system enjoys subject reduction and adequacy.
Theorem 4.1 (Accordance of the Analyses). N is typeable if and only if it is policy conformant.
To prove the theorem, we start by listing some preliminary results on some auxiliary functions of the Flow Logic and of
the type system, whose proof is easily derivable from the corresponding definitions.
Proposition 4.2. LetΛ = valΓ (`), Tˆ (l) = pi1(Γ (l)) for every l and σˆ (u) = Γ (u) for every u; then,
1. L`′MΛ
σˆ
= valΓ (L`′M`);
2. Tˆ 〈L`′MΛ
σˆ
〉 = Γ 〈L`′M`〉 and Tˆ [L`′MΛσˆ ] = Γ [L`′M`];
3. LδMΛ = LδMΓ` .
Wenowshow that the analysis ofmatching in Fig. 8 is correct; thiswill be neededhere to prove that function check`(Γ , T )
holds true whenever a read/input with target ` and template T has passed the static analysis. Also in this case, the proof
easily follows from the definitions.
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Proposition 4.3. 1. If match(LT Ml, et) = σ , l ∈ Λ, et ∈ Uˆ and σˆ |HΛ1 T : Uˆ F Wˆ , then et ∈ Wˆ and σ v σˆ .
2. Let l ∈ Λ and assume that for every et ∈ Uˆ ∩ Wˆ it holds that match(LT Ml, et) = σ v σˆ ; then, σˆ |HΛ1 T : Uˆ F Wˆ .
We can now prove that policy conformant processes and nets are typeable; this suffices to prove the ‘‘if" part of
Theorem 4.1. To this aim, given a triple (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) and a net N such that (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥, we define the typing
environment Γ as follows:
Γ (u) = σˆ (u) for every u ∈ LocVar
Γ (l) = 〈Tˆ (l); ∂l〉 for every l ∈ Loc, where ∂l = d l::eδP in N eδ
where ‘‘l ::eδ P in N" means that N ≡ l ::eδ P ‖ N ′, for some N ′.
Lemma 4.4. If (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P : ∂1,⊥ then Γ ; ∂2 `` P, wheneverΛ = valΓ (`) and ∂1 v ∂2.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of P . The base step is trivial; for the inductive step, we only give the most
complex cases.
Assume that P = eval(Q : δ)@`′.P ′; by the premises of the rules for action prefixing and action eval, we have that
1. (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P ′ :∂1,⊥
2. (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HL`′MΛσˆP Q :∂,⊥
3. ∀λ ∈ L`′MΛ
σˆ
: LδMΛ v ∆(λ)
4. ∂\L`′MΛ
σˆ
LδMΛ v ⊥
5. [L`′MΛ
σˆ
→ {e} ] v ∂1.
Point (1) and induction imply that Γ ; ∂2 `` P ′. Point (5), the hypothesis ∂1 v ∂2 and Proposition 4.2(1) imply that
e ∈ PrivΓ (∂2, `′′), where L`′M` = `′′. Point (4) is equivalent to ∂ v LδMΛ; by Proposition 4.2(3) and induction, this implies
thatΓ ; LδMΓ` ``′′ Q . By Proposition 4.2(3) and point (3), we have that LδMΓ` = LδMΛ v∏λ∈L`′MΛ
σˆ
∆(λ) v∏λ∈L`′MΛ
σˆ
pi2(Γ (λ)) =
PolΓ (`′′); the latter inequality holds because, by the hypothesis (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥ (that is assumed to buildΓ ),∆(k) v eδ
for every k ::eδ P in N . By construction of Γ , this implies that ∆(k) v pi2(Γ (k)), since pi2(Γ (k)) = d k ::eδP in N eδ. We have
all the premises of the typing rule for action eval; hence, Γ ; ∂2 `` P , as desired.
Assume that P = in(T )@`′.P ′; by the premises of the rules for action prefixing and action in, we have that
1. (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P ′ :∂1,⊥
2. σˆ |HL`′MΛσˆ1 T : Tˆ [L`′MΛσˆ ] F Wˆ
3. [L`′MΛ
σˆ
→ {i} ] v ∂1.
Point (1) and induction imply that Γ ; ∂2 `` P ′. Point (3), the hypothesis ∂1 v ∂2 and Proposition 4.2(1) imply that
i ∈ PrivΓ (∂2, `′′), where L`′M` = `′′. Point (2), Propositions 4.2(2) and 4.3(1) imply that check`′′(Γ , LT M`). Indeed, whenever
Uˆ = Tˆ [L`′MΛ
σˆ
] = Γ [L`′M`], we have that the set K = {et ∈ Uˆ : match(LT M`, et) is defined} is such that pii(K) ⊆ Γ (u), for
every i such that pii(T ) =! u; this suffices to conclude check`′′(Γ , LT M`). Thus, we can conclude Γ ; ∂2 `` P , as desired. 
Proposition 4.5 (‘‘If’’ Part of Theorem 4.1). If (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥ then Γ ` N.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the inference for (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥. We have two possible base cases:
• N = l :: 〈et〉: in this case, we have that {et} ⊆ Tˆ (l). By Proposition 4.2(2), this implies that et ∈ pi1(Γ (l)) and, hence,
Γ ` N .
• N = l ::eδ P: in this case, we have that
1. (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}P P : ∂, %
2. ∂ \{l} eδ v ⊥
3. ∆(l) \{l} eδ v ⊥
4. % v ⊥.
Point (4) implies that % = ⊥ and, similarly, points (2,3) imply that ∂ v eδ and ∆(l) v eδ. By Lemma 4.4, we have that
Γ ; eδ `l P . Moreover, by construction of Γ , it holds that pi2(Γ (l)) v eδ; this suffices to conclude that Γ ` l ::eδ P , as
desired.
The inductive step is trivial. 
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Conversely, we now prove that typeable processes and nets are policy conformant; this suffices to prove the ‘‘only if’’
part of Theorem 4.1. To this aim, given a typing environment Γ and a net N such that Γ ` N , we define the triple (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ )
as follows:
σˆ (u) = Γ (u) for every u ∈ LocVar
Tˆ (l) = pi1(Γ (l)) for every l ∈ Loc
To define ∆, we have to take, for every locality, the least upper bound of all the policies specified for sandboxes at that
locality. To this aim, we first need to remove every occurrence of self as target of eval actions in N as follows (we only give
the cases where the function is not the identity):
LN1 ‖N2M= LN1M ‖ LN2M Ll ::eδ PM = l ::eδ LPMlLP1 | P2M` = LP1M` | LP2M` L∗PM` = ∗ LPM`Lα.PM` = LαM`.LPM` Leval(Q : δ)@`′M` = eval(LQ ML`′M` : δ)@L`′M`
Then, for every l ∈ Loc, we have to calculate the least upper bound of the policies argument of eval actions whose target is
l or a variable that can assume value l:
∆(l) =
⊔
eval(P:δ)@` in LNM : l∈ valΓ (`) LδMΓl
Lemma 4.6. If Γ ; ∂ `` P andΛ = valΓ (`), then
1. (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P : ∂,⊥
2. for every eval(Q : δ)@`′ in P, it holds that LδMΓl v pi2(Γ (l)), for every l ∈ valΓ (`′) (for the sake of compactness, we shall
write the previous claim as PredEval(P,Γ )).
Proof. By induction on the inference for Γ ; ∂ `` P . The base step is trivial; for the inductive step, we only give the most
complex cases.
Assume that P = eval(Q : δ)@`′.P ′; by the premises of the rule for action eval, we have that
1. L`′M` = `′′
2. e ∈ PrivΓ (∂, `′′)
3. LδMΓ` = ∂ ′ v PolΓ (`′′)
4. Γ ; ∂ ′ ``′′ Q
5. Γ ; ∂ `` P ′.
Points (4, 5) and induction imply that (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HL`′MΛσˆP Q : ∂ ′,⊥ and (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P ′ : ∂,⊥. Points (1, 2) and
Proposition 4.2(1) imply that [L`′MΛ
σˆ
→ {e} ] v ∂ . Point (3) and Proposition 4.2(3) imply that LδMΛ = ∂ ′ and, hence,
∂ ′\L`MΛ
σˆ
LδMΛ v ⊥. To obtain (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P : ∂,⊥ it suffices to prove that, for every λ ∈ L`′MΛσˆ , it holds that LδMΛ v ∆(λ).
By construction of ∆, we have considered LδMΓλ when defining ∆(λ), for every λ ∈ L`′MΛσˆ ; since ∆(λ) has been defined as a
least upper bound, because of Proposition 4.2(3) we have that LδMΛ v ∆(λ).
We are left with proving PredEval(P,Γ ). By point (3), we have that LδMΓ` v PolΓ (`′′) = dλ∈ valΓ (`′′) pi2(Γ (λ)) v
pi2(Γ (λ)), where the last inequality holds for every λ ∈ valΓ (`′′) by definition of greatest lower bound. This fact, together
with PredEval(Q ,Γ ) and PredEval(P ′,Γ ) (that hold by points (4, 5) and induction), suffices to conclude.
Assume that P = in(T )@`′.P ′; by the premises of the rule for action in, we have that
1. L`′M` = `′′
2. i ∈ PrivΓ (∂, `′′)
3. check`′′(Γ , LT M`)
4. Γ ; ∂ `` P ′.
Point (4) and induction imply that (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P ′ : ∂,⊥ and PredEval(P ′,Γ ); hence, PredEval(P,Γ ) holds as well.
Points (1, 2) and Proposition 4.2(1) imply that [L`′MΛ
σˆ
→ {i} ] v ∂ . Point (3), Propositions 4.2(2) and 4.3(2) imply that
σˆ |HL`′MΛσˆ1 T : Tˆ [L`′MΛσˆ ] F Wˆ , for some Wˆ . Indeed, whenever Uˆ = Tˆ [L`′MΛσˆ ] = Γ [L`′M`], we have that the set K = {et ∈ Uˆ :
match(LT M`, et) is defined} is such that σ v σˆ , for every σ such that σ = match(LT M`, et) for some et ∈ K ; this suffices to
conclude σˆ |HL`′MΛσˆ1 T : Tˆ [L`′MΛσˆ ] F K . 
Proposition 4.7 (‘‘Only if’’ Part of Theorem 4.1). If Γ ` N then (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the inference for Γ ` N . We have two possible base cases:
• N = l :: 〈et〉: in this case, we have that et ∈ pi1(Γ (l)). By Proposition 4.2(2), this implies that {et} ⊆ Tˆ (l) and, hence,
(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HN N : ⊥.
• N = l ::eδ P: in this case, we have that
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1. Γ ; eδ `l P
2. pi2(Γ (l)) v eδ.
Point (1) and Lemma 4.6(1) imply that (Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |H{l}P P : eδ,⊥ and, clearly, eδ \{l} eδ v ⊥. Point (2) and Lemma 4.6(2)
imply that∆(l) \{l} eδ v ⊥. Indeed,
∆(l) =⊔l′::eδR in N ⊔eval(Q :δ)@` in LRMl′ : l∈ valΓ (`)LδMΓl
v⊔l′::eδR in N ⊔eval(Q :δ)@` in LRMl′ : l∈ valΓ (`) pi2(Γ (l))
v eδ
The inductive step is trivial. 
4.4. Analysis of the running example
Thanks to the previous theorem, we know that the running example can be typed; by looking at the proof of Theorem 4.1
(that shows how to define a proper Γ out of Tˆ , σˆ and the typed net N), we have that the following typing environment Γ
makes the running example typeable:
Γ (lK ) = 〈Tˆ (lK ); eδK 〉 Γ (x) = σˆ (x)
for every K ∈ {U, B, C} and x ∈ {title, data}.
4.5. Final remarks
Notice that pi2(Γ (l)) and ∆(l) are both used to statically analyze migrations at l of a process labeled with a policy δ,
but are defined and used in different ways. The former is a lower bound on the policy of the receiving node and, hence, δ
(properly evaluated) must be lower than pi2(Γ (l)). The latter is an upper bound to the policy specified for the migrating
process and, hence, ∆(l)must be greater than the evaluated policy resulting from replacing self with the actual locality in
δ. For this reason, pi2(Γ (l)) is defined as the greatest lower bound of the policies specified for nodes with address l; instead,
∆(l) is defined as the lowest upper bound of the policies specified for migrations at l. In this way, if we have twomigrations
at l (say, with policies δ1 and δ2) and the nodes l ::eδ1 · · · and l ::eδ2 · · ·, the type system checks that δi v eδ1ueδ2 = pi2(Γ (l)),
whereas the Flow Logic checks that∆(l) = δ1 unionsq δ2 v eδj. These two checks are equivalent, in that they are both equivalent
to δi v eδj.
5. Dynamic creation of localities
Having presented the Flow Logic and the type system for our extension of Klaim, we are now ready to consider the
newloc action, which allows processes to dynamically extend systems structure by creating new localities. The main
challenge when dealing with this construct is how the policies have to bemodified to take into account the new locality. We
investigate here an approach where newloc takes three arguments, namely a variable u that is bound to the new locality
name, a set C of capabilities that describes the capabilities that the creating locality should get with respect to the new
locality, and a policy δ′ that describes the policy associated to the newly created locality.
In the rest of this section, we first present the semantics of the newloc action and then show how to handle it with the
Flow Logic andwith the type system, respectively.We concludewith a short discussion on how to handlemore sophisticated
versions of the newloc action.
5.1. Semantics
To account for the creation of new localities, and to ensure their uniqueness, we change the form of the semantic
reduction rules from L F N −→ N ′ to L F N −→ L′ F N ′.
We add the following reduction rule for newloc:
l′ /∈ L l′ = u Lδ′Ml′ = eδ′ RM[eδ(l) 3 n]
L F l ::eδ newloc(u : C, δ′).P −→ L ∪ {l′} F l ::eδ[l′ 7→C] P[u 7→ l′] ‖ l′ ::eδ′ nil
The newloc(u : C, δ′) action creates a new locality with a fresh name in the system. The name is bound to the variable u
declared in the newloc action, thereby allowing the creating process to access and communicate with the newly created
locality as well as sending it to other processes in the system.
The decorated localities l′ and u in the premise of the rule above are used to denote canonical representatives. We do
assume that each locality and locality variable, say `, belongs to a family containing infinitely many localities with canonical
representative `. Hence, condition l′ = u ensures that variables can be instantiated at runtime only by localities ‘of the
same kind’. This condition is essential for the Flow Logic to compute sound estimates of all possible future behaviours of
the system without knowing in advance the exact localities created during execution. The condition does not impose any
severe requirement on the semantics and indeed later we argue that it can be safely ignored (and, hence, removed) when
introducing the type system.
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5.2. Reconsidering the running example
We reconsider the example presented in Section 2.2 and show how to make use of the newloc action. We extend the
example with a new process PBL running at lB that offers a special service to loyal customers, by which they can get books
out of the library directly. Let us assume that lU is a loyal customer, running process PUL, and add to the system the subnet
lB ::eδBL PBL ‖ lU ::eδUL PUL
The processes are:
PUL = in(!clubloc)@self.out(clubloc, self, J.R.R. Tolkien)@lBS . < await response >
PBL = newloc(club : {r, o}, [ ]).out(club)@lU .out(lU)@club.
in(club, !member, !request)@self.read(member)@club. < handle request >
The access policies of nodes are:
eδUL = [lU 7→ {i}, lB 7→ {o}]
eδBL = [lB 7→ {i, n}, lU 7→ {o}]
The process PBL creates a new locality stored in variable club that it shares with loyal customers, and uses it to checkwhether
a request comes fromany such customer (again, in this simple examplewe have omitted other, possibly disloyal, costumers).
The only requirement is that lLC and lBS have the capability to output tuples at each others locality. Of course, for executing
activity< handle request >, lBL might need more capabilities (according to the kind of the activity), but that is beyond the
scope of this example.
5.3. Flow Logic
We now show how to extend the Flow Logic from Section 3 to handle newloc. This extension mostly amounts to
exploiting canonical localities, that is replacing Locwith Loc. As a consequence of this, the analysis domainsmust be updated
to reflect the use of canonical localities:
• Tˆ ∈ Loc→ P (Loc∗)
• σˆ ∈ LocVar→ P (Loc)
• ∂ ∈ AbstractPolicy = Loc→ P (Capabilities)
• ∆ ∈ Loc→ AbstractPolicy
• % ∈ Loc→ Loc→ P (Capabilities)
• Λ ∈ P (Loc).
The rule for newloc to be added to the Flow Logic specification differs in format from the rules used previously in that
we, for the sake of simplicity, decide to analyze the continuation process together with the newloc itself.
u ∈ σˆ (u) [Λ→ {n}] v ∂ ∆(u) \{u} LδM{u} v %
(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP P : ∂ ′, % ∂ ′[u→ ∂ ′(u) \ C] v ∂
(Tˆ ,∆, σˆ ) |HΛP newloc(u : C, δ).P : ∂, %
In σˆ we record that the locality variable u is associated with the canonical name u and then we use u in the environment
entries. The premise [Λ→ {n}] v ∂ ensures that all localities where this action might be executed record the n capability.
The premise ∆(u) \{u} LδM{u} v % ensures that we correctly record potential violations that might arise from processes
remotely executed on the newly created locality. The fact that we analyze the continuation process in the rule that deals
with the newloc action itself makes it easy tomodify the analysis result arising from the continuation process: the actions of
C are permitted for any process running at the creating locality, so they should be removed as potential errors for processes
running at that locality — this is expressed by the premise ∂ ′[u→ ∂ ′(u) \ C] v ∂ .
To ensure soundness of the analysis result we require evaluated policies to be canonical consistent as defined below.
Definition 5.1 (Canonical Consistence). An evaluated policy eδ is canonical consistent iff l = l′ ⇒ eδ(l) = eδ(l′). A net is
canonical consistent if all evaluated policies occurring in it are canonical consistent.
When a canonical consistent net evolves, canonical consistence is preserved if
• in the original net, no newloc(u : C, δ) has a value of u that equals the canonical name l of any locality l in the net or
some u′ for any other newloc(u′ : C ′, δ′) occurring in the net, and
• in the original net, no distinct localities have the same canonical name, i.e. l 6= l′ ⇒ l = l′.
In the analysis of processes, this allows us to avoid computing the most restrictive or most permissive policy for analyzing
processes, as the evaluated policies coincide for all newly created localities.
The results proved for the analysis presented in Section 3.8 hold also in the enhanced framework; the newloc has no
dramatic impact on the proofs of such results, that are left to the interested reader.
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5.4. Type system
The type system can be easily adapted to deal with the form of newloc discussed so far. First of all, like in the Flow Logic
approach we have to work with canonical localities, that are locality sorts and are associated by the type system to the
localities and variables occurring in the analyzed net. Thus, we assign types to canonical localities and to variables: types
for canonical localities are pairs 〈T ; ∂〉, where T ⊂fin Loc∗ and ∂ ∈ AbstractPolicy = Loc → P (Capabilities); types for
input variables are sets of canonical localities T ⊂fin Loc. Of course, we now have that valΓ (l) = {l} and we still have that
valΓ (u) = Γ (u); consequently,
Γ 〈`〉 = ⋂ l∈ valΓ (`) pi1(Γ (l)) PrivΓ (∂, `) = ⋂ l∈ valΓ (`) ∂(l)
Γ [`] = ⋃ l∈ valΓ (`) pi1(Γ (l)) PolΓ (`) = d l∈ valΓ (`) pi2(Γ (l))
The typing rule for the newloc can be defined as follows:
u ∈ Γ (u) n ∈ PrivΓ (∂, `) LδMΓu v PolΓ (u) Γ ; ∂[u 7→ C] `` P
Γ ; ∂ `` newloc(u : C, δ).P
The main result of our paper, the accordance between the two analyses (Theorem 4.1), holds also in this new setting. To
establish this result, it suffices to add one more inductive case to the proofs of Lemmas 4.4 and 4.6.
It is worth noticing that, while the premise ‘‘l′ = u" in the operational rule for the newloc presented in Section 5.1 is
needed for the Flow Logic analysis, it could be removedwhen considering the type system.We have kept it to take advantage
of the results already proved for the Flow Logic. If we get rid of it, we could still use the type system as presented so far, but
we would need to explicitly prove the subject reduction theorem. Such a result would be formulated as follows:
If N1 is typeable and L1 F N1 −→off L2 F N2, then N2 is typeable.
Notice that, if L2 = L1, we can routinely prove that Γ ` N1 implies Γ ` N2. Otherwise, it must be L2 = L1 ∪ {l′}, for some
fresh l′ that has been created by some l as the result of a newloc(u : C, δ); in this case, we prove that Γ ` N1 implies
Γ ′ ` N2, where Γ ′ extends Γ in the following way:
• dom(Γ ′) = dom(Γ ) ∪ {l¯′};
• Γ ′( ¯`) =
{
Γ ( ¯`) if ¯` 6= l′
〈Γ 〈u〉; PolΓ (u)〉 otherwise
Then, we can freely let u be the canonical locality associated to l′ and this would make the premise ‘‘l′ = u’’ useless in the
semantics for newloc.
5.5. Final remarks
The version of newloc described in this section only supports modifications of the policies at the creating and at the
created localities. There are no provisions for granting any right to the other localities in the net relatively to the newly
created one. A possibility to generalize our approachwould take the formof broadcasting capabilities throughout the system
(possibly in a ‘controlled’ way) when a new locality is created.
To add broadcasting to the Flow Logic specification, onewould need to add a component very similar to the∆ component
in Section 3, which records policies for remotely executed processes as shown in Fig. 5. In the case of eval, it made sense to
compute the most permissive policy of all possible targets of the remote execution; in the case of newloc, it would be more
sensible to compute the most restrictive policy. This may be achieved by letting the Flow Logic calculate the set of relevant
policies and then take the intersection. The technical details in pursuing this approach are somewhat complex in the general
case, but become tractable when we take advantage of the restriction to canonical consistent policies.
As expected from what we already observed, the type system can be easily tailored for accommodating the handling of
the ‘broadcasting’ version of the newloc. Indeed, the typing rules remain the same. We just need to change part of the proof
of the subject reduction theorem of Section 5.4 in the case of a newloc: when passing from Γ to Γ ′, we add the entry for
the newly created node (as shown before) and update the existing information with the capabilities C over the canonical
locality associated to the new node.
6. Conclusions, and future and related work
We have considered an extension of Klaim, an experimental language designed for modeling and programming
distributed systems with mobile components, and have presented an operational semantics for it that, by taking advantage
of a reference monitor, permits controlling the kind of operations processes can perform at the different localities. We have
then considered an alternative approach to access control based on Flow Logic that permits statically checking absence
of access violations. Finally, we have reconsidered one of the existing type systems for access control with some dynamic
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checks and,by exploiting concepts from the Flow Logic, we have designed a fully static type system. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first completely static type system for controlling accesses in the context of a tuple space-based
coordination language. We have also shown that the two static approaches are sound with respect to the dynamic one
based on a reference monitor and provide the same analysis results.
Future work. We see this work just as an initial step towards understanding the relationships between static and dynamic
approaches to access control and towards studying the relative merit of type systems and Flow Logic specifications
(expanding on [24]). In futurework, we intend to study the relationships between the global approach of static type systems
(and FlowLogic) and themore local one of type systemswith dynamic checks.Moreover,we find it challenging to understand
the relative expressive power of referencemonitors and static analysis approaches also in light of the considerations of [35],
where it is claimed that the two approaches can capture different properties and are somehow incomparable. It would
be interesting to understand what assumptions on the models are necessary to guarantee relative soundness. Finally, it
would also be interesting to make the security model assumed in this paper more powerful, by following some directions
already taken for Klaim via type systems with dynamic type checks [14,15]. In particular, it would be challenging to allow
dynamically evolving policies (by means of capability passing, loss, expiration and/or removal) as in [14], or policies for
migrating agents that depend on the ‘‘source’’ site, as in [15].
Related work. In literature, there are many papers proposing static analysis techniques for process calculi, mostly based on
or inspired by type systems. Due to space limitations, wemention here only some of themost recent ones for process calculi
with distribution and process mobility. For type systems, we would like to mention [6,8,9,18,20]. In all these papers, a type
is assigned to the communication medium (either a located channel [18] or an ambient [6,8,9,20]) for regulating the data
exchanges in every computation. This is similar to our type-based approach. Indeed, also in our case every communication
medium (i.e., tuple space) is assigned a type that describes the kind of data that can be placed there. The main difference
between these approaches and ours is that our types are in principle less prescriptive, in the sense that different kinds of
data can appear in the same tuple space; on the contrary, channels and ambients usually host just one kind of data (actually,
this condition is sometimes relaxed by exploiting subtyping). Of course, the greater freedom of our types is compensated
by the check performed by functionmatch.
The use of canonical localities somehow resembles the use of abstract names in [21]. Both notions are used to group
together names (of localities in our case and of ambients in theirs) which can be assigned the same type. This turns out to
be very useful in calculi where names can be dynamically created. Also in the type system of [21], sets of abstract names are
used to overapproximate the behaviour of a system and the sort of data that can appear within an ambient. The approach
based on group types adopted in another paper on the Ambient calculus [7] is similar.
Flow Logics have been developed over the last decade as an approach for combining insights from Data Flow Analysis,
Control Flow Analysis, Abstract Interpretation and Type and Effect Systems [27]. The approach has been used for analyzing a
wide variety of programming languages exhibiting a variety of functional, imperative, or object oriented features; we refer
to [29] for an overview.
Only recently Flow Logic has been extended to deal with calculi of computation with concurrent, distributed and mobile
features. It has been used to analyze security properties in concurrent calculi, as for example the pi-calculus [3] and the LySa
calculus [2,5], viz. a variant of pi-calculus with cryptographic primitives. Also several variants of the Ambient calculus have
been analyzed with focus on security properties, see e.g. [25,23,12,4,30]; in particular, the latter presents various access
control policies. We would also like to mention [22], that studies security problems in the context of wireless networks as
represented by a calculus with broadcast.
Finally, there is a large body of work sharing with ours the aim of relating different static approaches to program analysis
and type systems for the same language.Most notably, previouswork has focused on Control FlowAnalysis and type systems
for higher-order functional languages (see e.g. [32,17,31,33]) or on Data Flow Analysis and type systems for imperative
languages [19]. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first considering a language with concurrency, distribution
and process mobility.
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